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Suicide attacks—the targeted use of
self-destructing humans against a per-
ceived enemy for political ends—are a
modern method with ancient roots.
From as early as the first century AD
the Jewish sect of Zealots (sicari) in
Roman occupied Judea used suicide as
a tactic against their enemies. Suicide
attacks in the Middle East can be
traced to the early Christian Crusades
in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries;
the Islamic Order of Assassins (also
known as Ismailis-Nazari) was actively
involved in similar activities. In the late nineteenth century Russian an-
archists and nationalist groups used suicide attacks, their preferred
method, to destroy and terrorise the enemy because they regarded it
as a source of legitimacy for the cause and a rallying point for future re-
cruits.
Suicide attacks were employed by the Japanese when they used
kamikaze pilots to attack American forces in the Pacific during World
War II. In April 1945 during the Battle of Okinawa, some 2000
kamikazes rammed their fully fuelled fighter planes into more than
300 ships, killing 5000 Americans in the most costly naval battle in the
history of the United States2. In the mid-twentieth century with the
development of better explosives and means of detonating targets,
suicide attacks declined in popularity amongst terrorist groups and
were replaced by remotely detonated explosives, hostage taking and
attacks on airlines. As counter terrorism methods began to improve in
the later half of the twentieth century methods of terrorist attacks
began to evolve as well. 
Suicide attacks in the Middle East
The advent of modern era suicide terrorism arguably began with the
attacks on the Iraqi embassy in Beirut in December 1981. In October
1983 the Hezbollah or Party of God, a Lebanese Shiite militant group
that has become a major force in Lebanese politics and society, carried
out suicide attacks on a US Army base in Beirut, which killed nearly 300
American and French servicemen. This led to the withdrawal of the
American and French multinational peacekeeping force in Lebanon
making suicide attacks an effective strategic political weapon. By 1985
the use of suicide attacks had succeeded in forcing Israel to abandon
most of southern Lebanon.
In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, suicide attacks began with attacks
by Hezbollah trained members of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad
(PIJ) aimed at derailing the Oslo Peace Accord. In 1988, PIJ founder
Fathi Shiqaqi had formulated the guidelines for “exceptional” martyr-
dom operations involving suicide attacks. Suicide attacks are now
plaguing the occupying forces in Iraq. They are becoming a weapon of
choice among the Iraqi resistance groups because of their lethality and
media impact. In general, suicide attacks constitute about three per-
cent of all terrorist incidents but account for almost half of the deaths
due to terrorism. When the US troops entered an abandoned factory
shed in Fallujah, Iraq during their siege of the city on 11 April 2004,
they found a large cache of leather belts stuffed with explosives along
with bomb making instructions. This is the first time since the thir-
teenth century that suicide attacks are being employed as a weapon of
coercion in Iraq.
The strategic logic of suicide attacks
Why are suicide attacks becoming so frequent and what motivates
the perpetrators of such attacks? A groundbreaking study by Universi-
ty of Chicago political scientist Robert Papp has shown that there is lit-
tle connection between religious fun-
damentalism (and for that matter reli-
gion) and suicide attacks. The leading
instigator of suicide attacks between
1980 and 2001 were the Tamil Tigers in
Sri Lanka, a radical nationalist group
whose members were from Hindu fam-
ilies but who were adamantly opposed
to religion. Religion is used effectively
by the Palestinian radical groups
Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and
the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades to recruit
suicide attackers and to raise opera-
tional funds. But the leadership of these organizations has a secular
goal: to coerce the Israeli government to change its policies and to
leave Palestinian territories. Even if some suicide attackers are irra-
tional or fanatical, the leadership of the groups that recruit and direct
them are not.3
Papp’s study shows that suicide attacks follow a strategic logic
specifically designed to coerce modern liberal democracies to make
significant political and territorial concessions. According to Papp, the
reason for the rise of suicide attacks over the past two decades is be-
cause “terrorists have learned that it pays.” Suicide attacks by members
of Hezbollah and Hamas were successful in compelling American and
French troops to leave Lebanon in 1983, Israeli forces to leave Lebanon
in 1985 and to quit the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 1994 and 1995.
The Tamil Tigers succeeded in winning major political and territorial
concessions from the Sri Lankan government from 1990 onwards using
this tactic. In the 1990’s suicide attacks by the Kurdistan Peoples Party
succeeded in winning partial cultural and political concessions from
the Turkish government. The withdrawal of the American troops from
Saudi Arabia in 1996, under pressure from terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda
supporters, also fit in with this pattern.
Psycho-social factors
Some contemporary commentators have argued that suicide attack-
ers are mentally deranged and crazed cowards who thrive in poverty
and ignorance. Such explanations about the psychological profiles
and motivations of suicide attackers unfortunately do not help us to ei-
ther explain the phenomenon or to better understand it. Traditional
studies regard suicide attacks as one of the many tactics that terrorists
use and thus do not explain the recent rise of this phenomenon. The
few studies, which have addressed suicide attacks explicitly, have
tended to focus on the suicide attackers’ individual motives such as re-
ligious indoctrination, especially Islamic fundamentalism, and on their
psychopathologies, poverty and lack of education. These explanations
have been found to be seriously flawed.
After reviewing psychological studies of suicide attackers, University
of Michigan psychologist Scott Atran has concluded that suicide at-
tackers have no appreciable psychological pathologies and are as edu-
cated and economically well-off as individuals from the surrounding
population. To understand why non-pathological individuals volun-
teer to become suicide attackers depends on the situational factors
which are largely sociological in nature. In the context of the Middle
East these include a collective sense of historical injustice, political
subservience, and a pervasive sense of social humiliations vis-à-vis
global powers and their allies. While one may have some reservations
about approaching the issue in the above way, ignoring the causes
that contribute to the tactic of suicide bombings risks failing to identi-
fy solutions to deal with and overcome it.
Martyrdom
Suicide attacks have increased dramatically in
the Middle East over the past year with the
war in Iraq and the escalation of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. This rise in suicide attacks
is remarkable given that the total number of
terrorist incidents worldwide fell from its peak
of 665 in 1986 to 190 in 2003 alone, whereas
the incidents of suicide attacks increased from
31 in the 1980s to 98 in 20031. There is
growing evidence that current American
domestic and foreign policies may be further
contributing to an acceleration of this trend.
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If suicide attackers exhibit no psychologically and socially dysfunc-
tional attributes or suicidal symptoms then why do individuals choose
to participate in such attacks? Part of the answer to this question lies in
what drives humans to suicide. In modern psychiatry and sociology
suicide is regarded as an end, an exit from adverse social conditions in
which the individual feels hopelessly powerless. In my own study of
suicide over the past thirty years I have found that suicidal behaviour
in a variety of settings may be a means to achieve multiple ends in-
cluding self-empowerment in the face of powerlessness, redemption
in the face of damnation, and honour in the face of humiliations.4 The
achievement of these multiple ends acts as powerful motivators in
many suicides and, in my opinion, is
central to a fuller and more meaningful
understanding and explanation of con-
temporary suicide attacks in the Mid-
dle East and elsewhere.
Nasra Hassan, a United Nations relief
worker in Gaza, interviewed 250 aspir-
ing suicide bombers and their re-
cruiters. She found that none were un-
educated, desperately poor, simple-
minded, suicidal or depressed. But
their social contexts displayed the dy-
namics of their actions. The potential
suicide bombers empowered them-
selves in the face of powerlessness. Ac-
cording to her respondents, “If our wives and children are not safe from
Israeli tanks and rockets, theirs will not be safe from our human
bombs.” In an interview in his small house on an unpaved lane in a
crowded quarter of Gaza the late spiritual leader of Hamas, Sheikh
Yassin, told her that martyrdom was a way of redemption: “Love of
martyrdom is something deep inside the heart, but these rewards are
not in themselves the goal of the martyr. The only aim is to win Allah’s
satisfaction. That can be done in the simplest and speediest manner by
dying in the cause of Allah. And it is Allah who selects martyrs.” Humil-
iation acted as a powerful magnet for recruiting suicide bombers. A se-
nior recruiter told her, “After every massacre, every massive violation of
our rights and defilement of our holy places, it is easy for us to sweep
the streets for boys who want to do a martyrdom operation.”5
Since Muslims professing religious motives have perpetrated most
suicide attacks over the past two years, including those on 11 Septem-
ber 2001, it may be obvious to conclude that Islamic fundamentalism is
the root cause of this phenomenon. This assumption has fuelled the
belief that future 11 September type of attacks can only be prevented
through liberalization and democratization of Muslim societies. This
was a key rationale used by the United States government to mobilize
public support for the war in Iraq. Policies based on such an assump-
tion may be fostering the development of domestic and foreign poli-
cies in the United States which are likely to worsen the situation.
One indication that this may be happening is reflected in the results
of the March 2004 Pew Global Attitudes Survey which showed that in
several Muslim countries (Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan) a majority of re-
spondents thought that the American government was overreacting
to terrorism. The respondents also supported suicide bombings by
Palestinians against Israel and against Americans and other Westerners
in Iraq. The International Institute of Strategic Studies in London has
also reported that the war in Iraq has led to an increase in global re-
cruitment for anti-American jihad.
Stemming the tide
What strategies can be used to stem the tide of suicide attacks? The
offensive military actions such as better border defences and home-
land security and concessions to the groups sponsoring suicide attacks
are not likely to succeed. According to
sociologist Kathleen Carley of Carnegie
Mellon University, eliminating the cen-
tral actors with extensive networks and
ties with the other cell members actu-
ally spurs terrorists to adapt more
quickly and is less effective in the long
run. Thus assassinations of leaders, a
favourite Israeli tactic, may be counter-
productive besides causing public re-
vulsion. 
Suicide attacks are carried out by com-
munity based organizations. Strategies
aimed at findings ways to induce com-
munities to abandon such support
may isolate terrorist organizations and curtail their activities. But ulti-
mately those strategies addressing and lessening the grievances and
humiliations of populations that give rise to suicide attacks are re-
quired for their elimination. Support for suicide attacks is unlikely to di-
minish without tangible progress in achieving at least some of the fun-
damental goals that suicide attackers and those supporting them
share.
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Even if some suicide attackers
are irrational or fanatical,
the leadership of the groups that
recruit and direct them are not.
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